science must be accountable to transcendent values and must be in dialogue with other disciplines, including ethics, philosophy, and theology.
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This essay critically examines a questionable presupposition of contemporary science—that science is an instrumental means to human ends
and as such is a value-neutral project. According to this presupposition,
the responsibility for the ethical evaluation of science concerns only the
uses to which science is put by society and thus does not belong properly
to the scientific profession. This view, which C. P. Snow called “the
myth of ethical neutrality,” is critiqued along ethical, philosophical,
and theological axes of analysis. Once we recognize that science is essentially a form of power, it becomes clear that science is morally ambiguous because the power over nature that science enables contains the
potential for domination over humanity. From the Christian perspective, which holds that all worldly power is “fallen,” it is evident that
science also is in need of being “ransomed” from evil uses and reoriented
toward the priorities of God’s Kingdom. Accordingly, to be responsible
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S

cience and Values
To expose and examine the contemporary presupposition of
the value-neutrality of science and its implications, I draw
from several statements on the relationship between science and
values as expressed by prominent scientists in the second half of
the twentieth century whose scientific works have significantly
impacted society.1

The Division of Labor
To gain leverage on this question of how contemporary science
views the relationship between science and values, I take as a pivot
point the view of Albert Einstein on the relationship between science and religion. Einstein saw an intimate motivational connection between religion (as he understood it) and scientific research.
He maintained, “The cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and
noblest motive for scientific research.” 2 He went so far as to say,
“In this materialistic age of ours the serious scientific workers are
the only profoundly religious people.” 3
Beyond such esoteric remarks, Einstein saw potential for a fruitful reciprocal relationship between science and religion that could
overcome a past of mutual suspicion and conflict. The goal of science, in his view, is to establish an objective, systematic knowledge
1. Heather Douglas, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2009), 44–65, shows that the contemporary ideal of the value-
neutrality of science is largely a product of the post–World War II era.
2. Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions (New York: Wings Books, 1954), 39.
3. Ibid., 40.
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of what is, namely, the facts about the observable world; this scientific knowledge then “provides us with powerful instruments for
the achievement of certain ends.” The limit of science appears as
soon as we introduce the question of value, namely, which ends
ought we pursue with science-enabled means? In his view, “the
ultimate goal itself and the longing to reach it must come from
another source,” for “knowledge of what is does not open the door
directly to what should be.” What is that other source? Einstein
concludes, “To make clear these fundamental ends and valuations
. . . seems to me precisely the most important function which religion has to perform in the social life of man.” 4 In a nutshell,
Einstein holds that science makes possible the means to do what
we so choose but is incapable of telling us what we should choose
to do; for that, we need religion-inspired values. Einstein sums it
up in a pithy statement: “Science without religion is lame, religion
without science is blind.” 5 In Einstein’s view, the goal of cooperation between scientific means and religious ends is the “free and
responsible development of the individual, so that he may place
his powers freely and gladly in the service of all mankind.” 6
Einstein achieved the peaceful coexistence and reciprocal cooperation between science and religion via a division of moral labor
premised upon a demarcation between disciplinary domains that
categorically dissects fact from value.
Science is the century-old endeavor to bring together by
means of systematic thought the perceptible phenomena of
this world into as thorough-going an association as possible.
4. Ibid., 42.
5. Ibid., 46.
6. Ibid., 43.
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. . . Religion is the age-old endeavor of mankind to become
clearly and completely conscious of [superpersonal] values
and goals and constantly to strengthen and extend their
effect. If one conceives of religion and science according
to these definitions then a conflict between them appears
impossible. For science can only ascertain what is, but not
what should be, and outside of its domain value judgments
of all kinds remain necessary. Religion, on the other hand,
deals only with evaluations of human thought and action:
it cannot justifiably speak of facts and relationships between
facts. . . . The realms of religion and science in themselves
are clearly marked off from each other.7
In short, science tells us the facts, religion inspires our values, and
each is mutually exclusive of the other.8 This fact/value dichotomy
correlates directly with a means/ends division: Science-discovered
facts provide a value-neutral means to achieve science-independent
ends inspired by religious values.9 It is assumed here that one can
independently evaluate means and ends and that the standards of
critique that apply to one (scientific methods) are disjointed from
those applying to the other (human goals). Hence, moral modes
of evaluation germane to religion are irrelevant to (indeed, inappropriate for) judging science as science; likewise, epistemological
modes of evaluation germane to science are irrelevant to (indeed,
inappropriate for) judging religion as religion. The two meet only
7. Ibid., 44–45.
8. See also Einstein, “Religion and Science: Irreconcilable?” in Ideas and Opinions.
9. On the connection between the fact/value dichotomy and the means/ends division,
see Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).
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in the practical endeavor, where the sole judgment to be made is
whether the scientific instruments are efficient and effective means
for the chosen ends.
Physicist Richard Feynman likewise performed a dissection of
the scientific and the ethical along a parallel fact/value line. Feynman claimed that “science and moral questions are independent”
on the grounds that “it is impossible to decide moral questions
[‘Should I do this?’] by the scientific technique,” which can answer
only questions of the form, “If I do this what will happen?” 10 It
is true that empirical science itself cannot decide our moral values (“ultimately we have to decide,” as Feynman puts it). From
the claim that questions of values cannot be decided by scientific
method, however, it does not follow logically that science and values are necessarily independent. For, as will be argued below, it
may well be that science has already decided (implicitly) in favor
of certain values as the very essence of its practice.
Einstein’s view of the mutual independence of science and religion, and thus of the value-neutrality of science, is not simply an
historical artifact. Indeed, the late Stephen Jay Gould articulated
this view more recently under the acronym NOMA: Science and
religion constitute “non-overlapping magisteria.” 11 Gould defines
this notion as follows: “Each domain of inquiry frames its own
rules and admissible questions and sets its own criteria for judgment and resolution. These accepted standards, and the procedures
developed for debating and resolving legitimate issues, define
the magisterium—or teaching authority—of any given realm.” 12
10. Richard P. Feynman, The Meaning of It All: Thoughts of a Citizen-Scientist (Reading, Mass.: Perseus Books, 1998), 44, 46.
11. Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New
York: Ballantine, 1999).
12. Gould, Rocks of Ages, 52–53.
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Applying this definition to science and religion, Gould demarcates
science as the domain of inquiry whose aim is the description and
explanation of “the factual construction of nature” and whose criterion of judgment is successful experience (i.e., if the experiment
works, if the theory explains, then the science is good).13 Religion
and ethics constitute a separate domain of inquiry whose aim is
the value and meaning of life.14 While Gould maintains that the
domains of science and religion “hold equal worth and necessary
status for any complete human life,” nonetheless these respective
domains are logically independent and methodologically distinct.15
Now, recognizing that Einstein was pantheistic (à la Spinoza)
and Gould was agnostic, one might think that such a view of science and religion is peculiar to nontheists. Not so. Jean Pond,
a biologist and a Christian, has taken up Gould’s NOMA view
and endorsed it from a Christian perspective. She writes, echoing
Gould:
Science and theology are different ways of acquiring different kinds of truths about the world. Science and theology
differ in their areas of inquiry and in the methods they use.
. . . Science seeks an understanding of the physical or natural
world, whereas theology seeks the fullest possible knowledge
of God’s actions in human history and God’s purpose for
our own lives.16
13. Ibid., 54.
14. Gould, like Einstein, bases separation of science and religion on a fact/value (or
“is-ought”) dichotomy. For his part, Gould acknowledges that this dichotomy is philosophically dubious but proceeds to utilize it anyway—see Gould, Rocks of Ages, 55–57.
15. Ibid., 58–59.
16. Jean Pond, “Independence: Mutual Humility in the Relationship between Science
& Christian Theology,” in Science and Christianity: Four Views, ed. Richard F. Carlson
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 81. Pond’s demarcation of science
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Pond concludes, concurring with Gould and Einstein, that the
NOMA approach resolves conflict between science and religion:
“If we maintain an independence between science and theology, if
we allow each the proper authority within its own field, many of
these problems are avoided.” 17
While avoiding conflict between science and religion is a desirable goal, the ethical implications of NOMA are what concern us
here. According to NOMA, science and religion, facts and values, are distinct domains, each having its own methods for how to
practice, rules for what is permissible, and criteria for what counts
as good. And because these mutually independent domains are
equal in status, it would be inappropriate either to apply the methods of science to religion and ethics or to apply the rules of religion
and criteria of ethics to the practice of science. In this way, scientific practice is free, not only from ecclesiastical encroachment but
also from accountability to any values that originate in any domain
outside science: Science as such is autonomous, accountable only
to its own rules. Now, it may be that many scientists do not consciously practice their profession according to a strict dichotomy
between scientific methods and human values. Still, NOMA’s demarcation of science and religion/ethics into mutually independent domains does effectively rationalize such a dichotomy.
from theology is implicitly premised on a distinction between physical nature and
human history—science can be cleaved from theology because science deals with
physical nature but God acts in human history. This distinction is dubious, both scientifically and theologically. According to the theory of evolution, which Pond endorses,
human history is bound up with natural history. Thus, while NOMA must exclude
God from natural history, Pond’s distinction would leave human evolution open to
divine action. And according to the witness of scripture, God has acted in human history by manipulating physical nature—most notably, from a Christian perspective, in
Jesus Christ, in whom God assumed bodily form in the created order. Pond’s distinction thus calls into question the orthodox doctrine of the Incarnation.
17. Pond, “Independence,” 103.
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Going forward, I am concerned primarily with the ethical implications for scientific practice of the division of moral labor between scientific means and religious ends. I will thus bracket, for
the purpose of this essay, the question of whether science and religion are actually as distinct in their respective methods as NOMA
claims. Recent work on science and religion has pointed to significant parallels between scientific methods and theological methods
concerning the role of paradigms, use of models, testing/selection
of theories, and so on, contrary to the NOMA thesis.18
The Myth of Neutrality
The so-called value-independence of science exemplifies the attitude that C. P. Snow called the “myth of the ethical neutrality
of science.” Snow, who rejected the myth, describes it as follows:
Whether [scientists] like it or not, what they do is of critical
importance for the human race. Intellectually, [science] has
transformed the climate of our time. Socially, it will decide
whether we live or die, and how we live or die. It holds decisive powers for good and evil. That is the situation in which
the scientists find themselves. They may not have asked for
it, or only have asked for it in part, but they cannot escape it.
. . . There is of course one way to contract out. . . . It consists
of the invention of categories—or, if you like, of the division
of moral labor. That is, the scientists who want to contract
out say we produce the tools. We stop there. It is for you,
the rest of the world, the politicians, to say how the tools
are used. The tools may be used for purposes which most of
18. See Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (San
Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 106–36, and Alister E. McGrath, Science
and Religion: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 144–76.
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us would regard as bad. If so, we are sorry. But as scientists,
that is no concern of ours. This is the doctrine of the ethical
neutrality of science.19
Erecting disciplinary boundaries along a sharp fact/value dichotomy, as Einstein outlined and Gould affirmed, effectively frees
scientific practice from the yoke of moral reflection. For, consider:
If science per se is about only facts, then good science is to be
judged solely by professionally defined standards and criteria that
measure only the correctness and accuracy of the methods used
for ascertaining and explaining the facts; thus, to do good science
one need not be burdened with questions of the value of one’s research, either the moral permissibility of one’s methods or the social implications of one’s conclusions. It is a short step from such
thinking to the myth that good science is always morally innocent:
If one’s responsibility as a scientist is circumscribed by narrowly
defined professional standards and criteria of success, and hence
scientific research per se is not accountable to moral standards or
social criteria, then it must be that the methods and content of
one’s science are ethically neutral—that is, science is innocent insofar as and to the extent that it satisfies those professional standards and criteria and is corrupted only through evil uses by social
choices. Implicit in this attitude is a division of moral labor between science and all other spheres of human responsibility: Science is an ethically neutral and thus professionally autonomous

sphere, within which scientists are to be concerned only with the
question of means, that is, the production of knowledge and technique, while the question of ends or values, that is, how knowledge
and technique are to be used, falls to other spheres within society.
This attitude is not merely harmless theorizing. Many atomic
physicists involved in the Manhattan Project did accept, and some
genetic scientists involved in the Human Genome Project have
since accepted, the myth of ethical neutrality. The consequent division of moral labor in the practical attitudes of scientists manifests
itself in various divisions—pure versus applied science, scientist as
researcher versus scientist as citizen, science versus democracy—
each of which implicitly presupposes some form of the fact/value
dichotomy.
Even after Hiroshima, J. Robert Oppenheimer, the scientific
director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory during the Manhattan Project, held to such a division of moral labor. When asked
several years later to give an account of his participation on the
scientific panel that advised President Truman’s Interim Committee on how to use the atomic bomb and which cities to target,
Oppenheimer divorced his expert advice from moral responsibility
for the ultimate decision: “What was expected of this committee
of experts was primarily a technical opinion on new questions,” a
task that presumably carried no further responsibility than merely
being factually accurate in one’s predictions.20 It’s not that Oppenheimer saw no connection between the physicists’ work and

19. C. P. Snow, “The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science,” in The New Scientist: Essays on
the Methods and Values of Modern Science, ed. P. C. Obler and H. A. Estrin (Garden
City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1962), 128–29, original emphasis. See also Roberta M.
Berry, “Eugenics after the Holocaust: The Limits of Reproductive Rights,” in Humanity at the Limit: The Impact of the Holocaust Experience on Christians and Jews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000).

20. Quoted in Robert Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the
Atomic Scientists (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt Brace, 1958), 209. In the words of Arthur H. Compton, another member of the expert committee, the panel gave a “technical reply to a technical question” (ibid., 182). Realize that the scientific panel was
estimating the range of destruction and the number of persons killed by the bomb and
recommending a target city that would maximize those effects.
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the destruction wrought by the bomb. He did, and he saw atomic
scientists themselves as having lost their innocence as a result.
However, he saw all of this as having no implication for how scientific research itself is to be done. He viewed moral reflection
on values as incompatible with the very practice of science itself,
which is aimed at facts. Answering questions of means and asking
questions of ends, he says, are mutually exclusive (or “complementary”); and this exclusivity limits the scientist’s sphere of professional responsibility to just the facts. Oppenheimer writes:
No scientist can hope to evaluate what his studies, his researches, his experiments may in the end produce for his fellow men, except in one respect—if they are sound, they will
produce knowledge. . . . The true responsibility of a scientist,
as we all know, is to the integrity and vigor of his science.
. . . If the professional pursuit of science makes good scientists . . . it is doing a great deal, and all that we may rightly
ask of it.21

impact of scientific research. In a July 1945 letter to physicist Leó
Szilárd, who served as the moral conscience of the atomic science
community, Teller released scientists from responsibility for any
military-political decision to drop the atomic bomb (to which he
objected) even before Hiroshima. Teller wrote:
The accident that we worked out this dreadful thing should
not give us the responsibility of having a voice in how it is
to be used. This responsibility must in the end be shifted
to the people as a whole and that can be done only by making the facts known. This is the only cause for which I feel
entitled in doing something: the necessary lifting of the
secrecy at least as far as the broad issues of our work are
concerned.23

The upshot of the fact/value dichotomy for Oppenheimer is a division between the scientist as researcher in the laboratory and the
scientist as citizen in society, which comprise two “complementary” aspects of one person who has separate spheres of responsibility but whose first responsibility is always to science.22
Edward Teller, who earned the epithet “father of the hydrogen bomb,” also divided the scientist’s work ethic from the social

After the war, fearing domination from a totalitarian Russia, he
held that the imperatives of absolute freedom of research and patriotic duty compelled the atomic scientist to employ his or her technical expertise in pursuit of nuclear physics to its utmost potential
for developing both energy and weapons. It is not that he felt the
scientist had no responsibility toward humanity; he did. Scientists,
Teller felt, should at least promote democracy (for the sake of both
humanity and science). But this should not in any way encumber
the unimpeachable imperative and unrestricted freedom of scientific research.24 Decades later, just before the costly and precarious
nuclear arms race collapsed under its own weight, Teller held to

21. J. Robert Oppenheimer, “Physics in the Contemporary World,” in The Open Mind
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955), 88, 90–1, 92–3.
22. For a fuller examination of Oppenheimer’s views on the responsibility of the scientist, see S. S. Schweber, In the Shadow of the Bomb: Oppenheimer, Bethe, and the
Moral Responsibility of the Scientist (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).

23. Quoted in Tamara L. Roleff, ed., The Atom Bomb (San Diego, Calif.: Greenhaven
Press, 2000), 205.
24. Edward Teller, “Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities,” Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists (December 1947): 354–55.
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his original view that the scientist is responsible only for increasing and disseminating knowledge without limit; responsibility for
answering questions about the value and uses of science in a democratic society, in his view, falls to the general public:
Now as then, my argument is for knowledge and against
ignorance. Now as then, I offer no detailed proposals as to
how the knowledge, once acquired, should be used. Scientists have the responsibility to make knowledge available and
to explain its possible applications. The decision as to which
uses should be adopted, now as then, should belong to the
entire community. That is indeed the main principle on
which a democratic society rests.25
This historical recollection aims not at condemning particular
scientists for the hard choices they made in complex and ambiguous circumstances, but rather at uncovering and critiquing the attitudes by which those scientists understood themselves and their
research in relation to moral ends. An honest history teaches that
a division of moral labor underwritten by a fact/value dichotomy
that insulates science from external critique and disburdens the
scientist of moral responsibility for the uses of research tends to
cultivate a cavalier attitude toward social concerns.26 When faced
with moral questions about the atomic bomb during the last
days of the Manhattan Project, Enrico Fermi, who built the first
25. From Edward Teller, Better a Shield Than a Sword, excerpted in Roleff, The Atom
Bomb, 212.
26. There were exceptions in the Manhattan Project, in particular Leó Szilárd, who
functioned as the moral conscience of the atomic scientists. Few were swayed by his
arguments and efforts, however. See Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 171–90.
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chain-reacting atomic pile, was known to reply: “Don’t bother
me with your conscientious scruples! After all, the thing’s superb
physics!” 27 And Oppenheimer, amid Cold War questioning of his
political loyalty, said of the hydrogen bomb once the Korean War
had begun, “It is my judgment in these things that when you see
something that is technically sweet you go ahead and do it and
you argue about what to do about it only after you have had your
technical success.” 28 (To gauge the moral callousness of such an
attitude, simply imagine such words in the mouth of Nazi SS physician Dr. Josef Mengele regarding his eugenic studies of twins at
Auschwitz: “Don’t bother me with your conscientious scruples!
After all, it’s superb biology!”)
Such an attitude was not simply a creature of the Cold War era
but also appeared in the context of the Human Genome Project.
Walter Gilbert, who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for developing novel techniques of DNA sequencing, wishes to separate
the potentially negative social impacts of molecular genetics from
the mandate of scientists to pursue knowledge unencumbered by
moral debate. Gilbert, tacitly bracketing out the social aims that
led the U.S. government to fund the “big science” project in the
first place, casts the Human Genome Project as a pure “science for
knowledge’s sake” endeavor of discovery that evidently needs no
external justification. Gilbert writes:
To work out our DNA sequence is to achieve a historic step
forward in knowledge. . . . The human genome project can
be viewed as a purely technological effort to obtain the DNA
sequence, put it into a computer data base, and study it. . . .
27. Quoted in Jungk, 202.
28. Quoted in Ibid., 296.
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The genome project is an application of scientific technology
to produce a certain end—the information content of the
genome.29
Correspondingly, though aware of the possible social problems
created by this new knowledge, Gilbert sees these potential impacts as outside the scope of the Human Genome Project, as
problems concerning the general public, and not the proper responsibility of science itself: “Gene typing and genetic mapping
could also have very strong social effects. However, the problems
posed by the knowledge are not insurmountable and can be dealt
with in a democratic society.” 30 Because the human genome is
the self-justifying holy grail of biological science, and because it
is society’s responsibility to answer the hard questions, moral values and social criteria should not constrain genetic research and,
hence, potentially harmful impacts should pose no obstacles to
discovery.
James D. Watson, codiscoverer of the double-helical structure of DNA and former chief of the NIH’s National Human
Genome Research Institute, is aware of the recent eugenic past
of human genetics in the Western democracies and sensitive to
the social-ethical implications of genomic research and thus has
advocated for legal protection of personal genomic information.
Watson, however, appears to be motivated more by the desire to
protect science from the backlash of a fearful society than by the
desire to protect society from harmful uses of science: “The acquisition of human DNA information has already begun to pose
29. Walter Gilbert, “A Vision of the Grail,” in The Code of Codes: Scientific and Social
Issues in the Human Genome Project, ed. D. Kevles and L. Hood (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1992), 83, 90, 92.
30. Gilbert, “A Vision of the Grail,” 95.
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serious ethical problems. . . . We need to explore the social implications of human genome research and figure out some protection
for people’s privacy so that these fears do not sabotage the entire
project.” 31 It thus seems that, as Watson sees it, the point of attending to the social implications of scientific research through
public policy is to maintain the professional autonomy of scientific
research.
Beyond the Myth
The upshot of the myth of ethical neutrality and the corresponding division of moral labor is the insulation of science per se from
moral critique, the creation of a domain of action within which
scientists may work without moral ambiguity and thus with professional autonomy. This view of the value-neutrality and professional autonomy of science, which is widely held among scientists,
is beginning to be challenged from within the scientific profession.32 My aim in this essay is to critique these twinned claims
along four axes of analysis: ethical, epistemological, ontological,
and theological. I will consider science as the practice of a profession, as the pursuit of knowledge, and as a form of power. Each
axis of analysis, from its own angle, will reveal an axiological dimension of science.33 The first two angles of critique—ethical and
epistemological—will, for the most part, retrace familiar ground
and thus will not delve into detail. The third and fourth angles
of critique—ontological and theological—will cover new ground.
31. James D. Watson, “A Personal View of the Project,” in Code of Codes, 172–73.
32. For example, Kristen K. Intemann and Immaculado de Melo-Martin, “Regulating Scientific Research: Should Scientists Be Left Alone?” The FASEB Journal 22, no.
3 (2008): 654–58.
33. It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore the possible interdependency between these respective axiological dimensions of science.
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Beginning from the ontological analysis of science as power, I will
establish a vantage point from we can ethically assess the scientific
pursuit within the horizon of Christian faith.34
Science and Values: Ethical Critique
Professional Ethics
From the perspective of science as a professional practice, the division of moral labor is suspect; it ignores the institutional entanglement of science in society and the financial dependence of science
on society, which have become inescapable aspects of the actual
practice of contemporary science.35 Kristin Shrader-Frechette has
developed a “trustee model” that sets the epistemological pursuit
of science in the context of the social responsibility of the specialized professions. Because scientific researchers constitute a professional class that receives special benefits from society—education,
training, and resources—there is an implied or tacit contract that
obligates scientists to do research to promote scientific knowledge
and to be a wise steward of that knowledge for the public good.
Because of their specialized training, which is afforded to a privileged few in society, scientists have a near monopoly on specialized knowledge upon which society depends. This monopoly gives
scientists a power over society at large and, hence, a corresponding
34. Robert Proctor, Value-Free Science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), also challenges the value-neutrality of
science by analyzing science as a form of power, but from a secular perspective.
35. See Leslie Stevenson and Henry Byerly, The Many Faces of Science: An Introduction
to Scientists, Values & Society (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), and Douglas
Allchin, “Values in Science and in Science Education,” in International Handbook of
Science Education, ed. B. J. Fraser and K. G. Tobin (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1988), 2:1083–92.
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social responsibility: “Along with specialized knowledge, power
and benefits . . . come special responsibilities.” 36 Society thus “entrusts” science with the pursuit of knowledge for the good of society as a whole and not just for science as a self-contained and
self-justifying endeavor.
William May has articulated a similar view with regard to professional responsibility.
Why do professionals owe service to the common good? . . .
Normally, the state licenses them. The society expects professionals to state publicly their own standards of excellence,
to conform to those standards individually, and to enforce
them upon colleagues within the guild. Further, modern
professionals wield a public power that vastly exceeds that
of their predecessors in the professions. What they do today
fatefully affects human flourishing. Professionals have even
less reason than their predecessors to construe their power in
purely private, entrepreneurial terms.37
May’s observation concerning professional standards adds an important point. The licensing process in consulting professions such
as medicine, law, and accounting both implies the act of trust that
society makes in permitting the professional to practice and identifies the basis of that trust: the ethical accountability of each profession to public criteria that not only reflect the internal standards
of competent practice peculiar to the professions but also project
36. Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Ethics of Scientific Research (New York: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1994), 25.
37. William F. May, Beleaguered Rulers: The Public Obligation of the Professional (Louis
ville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 21.
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the societal aim of the common good that is the very reason for
the professions’ existence. The consulting professions, practiced
properly, thus include an essential sense of fiduciary responsibility,
which reflects the fact that certain aspects of the common good
have been entrusted to specialized professionals on behalf of general society. Historically, the scholarly professions, including the
sciences, have not been subject to public licensure.38 Perhaps the
institution of a (voluntary) public license for scientific research—
say, a “Certified Public Scientist” designation administered by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science—might
mitigate the divorce of research objectives from public goals and
stimulate a sense of fiduciary responsibility to the common good
in scientific practice.
Christian Ethics
The division of moral labor in professional practice is suspect also,
and especially, from a Christian ethical perspective. Consider the
“two office” or “two vocation” version of “two kingdom” ethics,
which the Protestant tradition has emphasized. According to this
view, every lay Christian has two callings: the common calling of
all believers to serve brothers and sisters within the church and a
special calling of each one to serve neighbors within society by the
practice of a profession or trade or by holding civic office. No calling is more “holy” or “worthy” than another, for all are ordained
by God, such that to fulfill one’s professional duty is to render
obedience to God. This, in itself, is not problematic. The problem
surfaces when we inquire about the ethical standards that apply to
38. On the similarities and differences between the consulting professions and the
research professions, see Michael D. Bayles, Professional Ethics (Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth Publishing, 1981), 7–11.
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these respective vocations.39 Thus, the “two vocation” view holds
that science, one of the specialized professions, may be practiced
as a Christian vocation. Okay so far. Now suppose we were to
adopt the division of moral labor and apply it to scientific research
as a Christian vocation. This division (à la NOMA) would imply
that a Christian who practices her profession properly as a scientist does not consider moral ends or religious values in the context
of her scientific research but does her scientific research according
only to the standards proper to science as such.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer rejected a division of moral labor that
would narrowly circumscribe one’s Christian duty within the private sphere and advance an ethic foreign to the gospel for one’s
professional vocation in the public arena. He insisted that the
Christian vocation and its particular, gospel-rooted ethic must
encompass the whole of life: “Vocation is responsibility and responsibility is a total response of the whole man to the whole of
reality; for this very reason there can be no petty and pedantic
restricting of one’s interests to one’s professional duties in the narrowest sense. Any such restriction would be irresponsibility.” 40 In
this same spirit, Duane Friesen has argued that there can be no
appeal to professional specialty as a buffer from accountability to
criteria and responsibility for ends that transcend one’s vocational
domain:
If we are to approach a profession from a Christian point of
view, we need a place to stand, a framework for assessment
39. Concerning the Protestant idea of Christian vocation and the problem of the
ethical standard for public vocation, see Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1950), 153–90.
40. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (New York: Macmillian, 1955), 254.
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that transcends both the standards of competence provided
by a profession as well as our own personal standards of success and satisfaction. Without that transcendent framework,
the workspace becomes an autonomous sphere of life no
longer subject to interpretation within a world created and
sustained by God. The workspace can then easily become
an occasion for the expression of the demonic rather than
service to the neighbor or the common good.41
What Friesen writes concerning the professions in general applies
to science in particular: From a Christian perspective, the internal standards of competent science are relevant but insufficient for
practicing science as a vocational service to society in accord with
Christian duty.
The view of Jean Pond, cited above, illustrates the point.
Defending the mutual independence of science and theology
(NOMA) from a Christian perspective, she addresses a common
objection: “Christians who maintain an independence between science and faith are sometimes accused of being ‘bifurcated’ people.
That is, our lives are compartmentalized. The religion compartment operates on Sunday—in church—but on Monday the science compartment takes over as work resumes in the laboratory.” 42
Pond, a biologist, answers this objection not by refuting compartmentalization but by observing that the Sunday/Monday divide
is common to all Christians in specialized professions: “I’ve never
understood why a job in science should be much different than
a job in, say, major league baseball. We operate according to the
41. Duane K. Friesen, Artists, Citizens, Philosophers: Seeking the Peace of the City; An
Anabaptist Theology of Culture (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 2000), 219.
42. Pond, “Independence,” 90.
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commonly accepted rules of science just as baseball players have a
set of rules in baseball.” 43 That compartmentalization is common
practice, however, is precisely the problem; that any specialized
profession, science included, should understand itself as simply
operating by “its own rules” is inadequate as a Christian perspective of professional practice.
The ethical critique of the division of moral labor may be stated
more generally. As H. R. Niebuhr pointed out, it is only by an exercise of intellectual abstraction that one can claim that ethics and
values constitute a demarcated domain and thus a peculiar vocation, a specialized activity separable from other human activities.
Existentially, ethics by way of value choices pervades all human
activities. Science, like all human activities, therefore, is morally
ordered; the only question is what that moral ordering is. Niebuhr
writes:
The question the moralist raises is not whether such science is in conflict with morality, but whether such science
is adequately aware of its own moral character and whether
scientists are sufficiently philosophic or comprehensive in
their outlook so as to be able to order their activity as moral
within the whole complex of human personal activities.44
Niebuhr cites commitment to knowledge as a good, the discipline
of self-criticism, and faithfulness in truth telling as characteristics
of the moral ordering of science.
43. Ibid., 90–91.
44. H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper
& Row, 1960), 136.
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Science, Values, and Power: Philosophical Critique
Epistemology of Science: Science as Knowledge
The fact/value dichotomy underlying the division of moral labor
is suspect also from an epistemological perspective. The fact/value
dichotomy finds its philosophical sources in empiricism, which,
following the eighteenth-century philosopher David Hume, takes
the “is-ought” distinction as a categorical truth. Philosophy of
science over the second half of the twentieth century thoroughly
criticized and almost uniformly rejected strict empiricism and its
dogmas, whether of the positivist or falsificationist variety, and
the associated fact/value dichotomy.45 In short, any epistemology that would be descriptively accurate of both the history and
contemporary practice of science must acknowledge that scientific methodology is value-structured to at least some degree. This
axiological aspect of science appears in several interrelated forms:
the “theory-ladenness” of observation, the logical analysis of “crucial experiments,” the underdetermination of theory by evidence,
and, consequently, the inevitable role of cognitive values in theory
choice.46 While the value-structure of scientific methodology need
not undermine the epistemological objectivity of scientific theo45. On the background, and collapse, of the fact/value dichotomy, see Putnam, The
Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy, 7–45.
46. See Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1982), Willard V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), Norwood Russell Hanson, Perception and Discovery (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1969), Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1962), Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), and W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981).
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ries, nonetheless the acceptance of any particular theory in science
does imply the prior (or concurrent) acceptance of certain value
judgments.47
This epistemological critique has been augmented by sociological inquiry that has exhibited the interrelation of epistemology and sociology in science. Perhaps the most common form of
the myth of ethical neutrality is the dichotomy of “pure versus
applied” science, where “pure” science is value-neutral because
it pursues knowledge for its own sake while “applied” science is
value-structured because of the explicit social, economic, or political aims and interests of the institutional and corporate contexts in
which it gets done. The notion of “pure” science, however, is disingenuous from the beginning, not only because of the institutional
relationships of science to social sources of support already noted
but also because so-called pure science has its own normative sociology—an institutionally organized, value-structured social system
(e.g., the peer-review process)—that is integral to science being a
knowledge-seeking enterprise.48 Robert Merton characterized the
“ethos” of science not as value-neutral but rather as embodying
47. I thus concur with the late Ernan McMullin that the value-structure of science
does not necessarily militate against objectivity in science. See McMullin’s essays,
“Values in Science,” Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (2003): 3–28,
and “The Shaping of Scientific Rationality: Construction and Constraint,” in Construction and Constraint: The Shaping of Scientific Rationality, ed. E. McMullin (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 1–47. See also my own essays,
“Formalism, Ontology, and Methodology in Bohmian Mechanics,” Foundations of
Science 8, no. 2 (2003): 109–72, and “Underdetermination, Realism, and Theory Appraisal: An Epistemological Reflection on Quantum Mechanics,” Foundations of Physics 35, no. 4 (2005) 669–95.
48. See Henry H. Bauer, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992), and Frederick Grinnell, The Scientific
Attitude, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press, 1992).
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four norms—universalism, communalism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism—that link together the value-structured sociology of the scientific profession and the knowledge-seeking aim
of the scientific pursuit.49
Ontology of Science: Science as Power
The philosophical critique of the value-neutrality of science goes
deeper than epistemology. For, ontologically, science is a form of
power of control exercised over, and by means of, the capacities
of nature. The exercise of the power of control, scientific and otherwise, is never morally neutral because it always presupposes one’s
right to do so. And, as E. A. Burtt emphasized, such unreflective
presupposition of right and exercise of power of control in science
tacitly reflects underlying value commitments regarding scientific
knowledge that are unconsciously and uncritically adopted from
one’s historical and social setting.50
Unlike technology, which manipulates previously known
potentialities, moreover, science is the power of creating new
49. Robert K. Merton, “The Ethos of Science,” in On Social Structure and Science
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
50. E. A. Burtt, “The Value Presuppositions of Science,” in The New Scientist, 259:
“We tend to assume that science will continue to be what it has come to be, and will
continue as before to employ its familiar presuppositions and methods; the problem of
avoiding destruction through science is, we think, the problem of securing wise moral
control over the applications of scientific discovery that affect human life for weal or
woe. . . . My major contention will be that the very theoretical foundations of science
as well as its practical applications reflect certain value-commitments of which we are
largely unaware. . . . In the course of this analysis I shall try to show that our zealous
endeavor to create a “value-free” science—which seems so essential a requirement of
objective scientific method—has meant simply that the values dominating our thinking have retired to the arena of our underlying assumptions, where they can maintain
themselves against critical appraisal by being so completely taken for granted that no
one’s questioning attention is focused upon them.”
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technologies, new ways of controlling—intervening in and manipulating—the capacities of nature.51 Science brings into existence new possibilities for human action, both good and evil, and
thereby effectively chooses not for itself alone but for all humanity by making the realization of certain human choices possible
in the first place. Thus, the question of the values or ends of science is implicit already even in so-called pure research. Science,
because it is a form of power of control, is value-structured by its
very essence and not only because of its consequences. The fact/
value dichotomy, therefore, fundamentally misunderstands the
nature of the scientific endeavor: Science is neither a disembodied
collection of knowledge claims nor an abstract method or procedure, but a web of concretized beliefs and embodied practices that
is both enabled by and dominant over, both servant and master
of, nature.52 Hence, the myth of ethical neutrality is a nonstarter.
Here, Francis Bacon is a better reference point than David Hume
for understanding science: In science, Bacon noted at the beginning of The New Organon, “Human knowledge and human power
meet in one.” 53
Even Einstein seems to have failed to realize fully the enduring lesson of the Manhattan Project. In the wake of Hiroshima
Einstein proclaimed a duty of scientists to realize actively the aim
of peace,54 yet at the same time he told his young assistant: “Yes,
51. Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), famously argued for scientific realism on the basis of the power of science to increase our control over nature through the development of new interventions
into the capacities of nature.
52. See Grinnell, The Scientific Attitude, and Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
53. Francis Bacon, The New Organon (New York: Macmillian, 1960), 39.
54. Einstein, “A Message to Intellectuals,” in Ideas and Opinions, 148: “We scientists,
whose tragic destination has been to help in making the methods of annihilation more
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now we have to divide up our time like that, between politics and
our equations. But to me our equations are far more important,
for politics are only a matter for present concern. A mathematical
equation stands forever.” 55 Nuclear physics, though, for all practical purposes did change politics forever; for knowledge confers
power of control, and such power and the moral-political question
of its use endure as long as the knowledge is preserved. The advent
of knowledge of nuclear fission and the production of the atomic
bomb set before all humanity a dilemma it previously did not have,
it did not knowingly choose, and for which it was unprepared,
a dilemma that has foreclosed the future possibility of a world
order over which nuclear holocaust and nuclear terror do not loom
as menacing threats. Until we destroy our equations by destroying ourselves (perhaps, tragically and ironically, through the very
use of such knowledge), nuclear weapons will remain a permanent
scientific-technological achievement with which, at least for the
foreseeable future, every global politics must negotiate.56
The sequencing and mapping of the human genome, too, will
cast a long shadow over the possibilities and choices of future generations. Instead of whether the next generation will have a future,
however, the political question to be negotiated will be in whose
image the next generation is to be made and who is to decide. We
are no better prepared for such dilemmas than we were for those
foisted upon us by the atomic bomb.57 We have seen a fictional
gruesome and more effective, must consider it our solemn and transcendent duty to do
all in our power in preventing these weapons from being used for the brutal purpose
for which they were invented. What task could possibly be more important for us?
What social aim could be closer to our hearts.”
55. Quoted in Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 249.
56. See Walter M. Miller Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz (New York: Bantam Books,
1959).
57. See Berry, “Eugenics after the Holocaust.”
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preview of our eugenic future in the film Gattaca—a society divided by genetic endowment, created not by state coercion but by
parental choice via in vitro fertilization and embryonic genetic selection. We also get a representative sample of our eugenic future
in the ongoing practice of eugenic abortion by parental choice. The
ready availability and normalized use of prenatal diagnostic tests
for inherited diseases such as Tay-Sachs and Down Syndrome
prior to the development of complementary therapeutic capabilities has opened up the (assuredly unintended) possibility of such
technology being employed clinically in the service of the elective
abortion of children diagnosed in utero with “genetic diseases,” a
possibility that has thus burdened medical professionals and expecting parents with new and profound moral dilemmas.
Any scientific achievement that either opens or forecloses significant possibilities for human life and community to flourish or
decay already constitutes a moral choice that implies an enduring
responsibility of which the scientist cannot disburden himself or
herself by simply invoking a division of moral labor and saying,
“That’s not my business.” Consider the case of prenatal genetic
diagnosis. While the researchers who develop these capabilities
are themselves not culpable for (and may well be greatly troubled
by) eugenic abortions based on prenatal genetic tests, they are
responsible (at least in part, especially given the present legal regime of liberal abortion rights) for creating a situation in which
the realization of such “reproductive choices” is made possible by
medical technology. Whereas culpability may end with conscious
intention and foreseeable consequences, responsibility does not.
This, of course, was the implicit message of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein: Dr. Frankenstein remains responsible for the “monster”
he has created, whether or not he intended his creature to use its
powers for destruction. Thus, as I see it, the same researchers who
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develop prenatal genetic diagnostics have an ongoing responsibility to both pursue complementary therapeutic capabilities and secure restrictions on the use of such diagnostics in the meantime.58
As Richard Bube writes, moreover, because “every advance with
the potentiality for good has a potentiality for evil that is probably
proportional to the good,” this is a responsibility that scientists
must consider from the beginning of their research, and not only
at the end: “Since scientists are the producers of the potentiality for
good or evil, their responsibility does not begin only when the potentiality has been brought into existence, but it begins back when
the potentiality is still only an unrealized speculation.” 59 This leads
Bube to pose the following test question for responsible science:
“If a scientist would not approve the use of a process or device if
developed, shouldn’t he refuse to work on its development?” One
might counter that it is impossible for scientists to actually know
the practical potential of scientific research, for good or evil, at the
point of initial discovery. That may be so in some cases. But in the
case of nuclear physics, at least, the potential for vast destructive
power, and the political implications of that power, was realized
almost immediately upon the discovery of nuclear fission.60
Once we recognize science as essentially power of control and
also acknowledge the ontological ambiguity of human existence—
that we are both subject and object, actor and patient, mind and
58. Francis S. Collins, who developed the genetic test for cystic fibrosis and led the
Human Genome Project in the United States, has indicated sensitivity to the ethical dilemma posed by diagnostic capability without therapeutic capability—see The
Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (New York: Free Press, 2006),
241–42.
59. Richard H. Bube, “A Crisis of Conscience for Christians in Science,” Perspectives
on Science and Christian Faith 41 (1989): 11–19.
60. See Jungk, Brighter than a Thousand Suns, 71ff.
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body—this philosophical critique can be taken a step further to
bring ontology back to ethics. Because human persons are both
observers of and participants in nature, every power of control
gained over nature is power of control gained over human beings,
their lives and welfare. Even if ostensibly undertaken “disinterestedly” as the pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself, science is
always already the potential for subverting humanity as an end,
for converting the human person into an instrumental means to
other ends, including knowledge itself. Thus, far from fulfilling
the myth of ethical neutrality, science cannot escape the paradox
of ethical ambiguity—that although science is a project of human
freedom, it always already generates (the potential for) action
against human dignity.61
The ontological analysis of science as power of control carries
ethical implications for not only science but also philosophy of
science. Social-constructivist antirealist philosophies of science
interpret scientific theories—including theoretical physics—
as mere social phenomena, as free constructions constituted by
human relations rather than as true or false representations of the
world constrained by an external, independent physical reality.
To scientists the realism/antirealism debate may seem a harmless verbal dispute among philosophers and sociologists. The real
consequences of a social construct, however, are quite different
than those of a true representation: The former confers at most
the social power of prejudice, whereas the latter confers material
power to control and destroy. A social-constructivist antirealist
philosophy of science would thus lead to a very different appraisal
61. See Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Citadel Press, 1976),
99: “Thus one finds himself in the presence of the paradox that no action can be generated for man without its being immediately generated against men.”
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of scientific responsibility if the only weapons science could devise
were categories of social prejudice. Of course, insofar as scientific
theories do reflect and reinforce social prejudice and thereby legitimate oppression, science is culpable; and sociological (as well
as feminist) critiques of science are certainly helpful to the extent
that they expose the sources and effects of such bias in science.62
But is it not a serious offense to the memory of the victims at
Hiroshima to say that all that theoretical physics contributed to
their horrific deaths was a social construct? This raises the question: Can there be an ethically responsible social-constructivist
antirealist philosophy of science that does justice to the victims of
science-enabled violence? In any case, the upshot here is that not
only is a value-free (empiricist-positivist) epistemology of science
premised upon a sharp fact/value dichotomy inadequate, but so
also is a value-full (social-constructivist) epistemology that makes
no fact/value distinction at all. For, as Hilary Putnam observes,
while the fact/value dichotomy fails, there is nonetheless a genuine
distinction to be maintained between fact and value even if there is
an “entanglement” of fact and value in scientific knowledge.63
Science and Power: Theological Critique
Theology of Power
I have already noted the ways in which science is power. Science
wields intellectual power of knowledge concerning nature’s capacities as well as technical power of control over nature’s capacities.
62. See Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1974), David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), and Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
63. Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy.
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It is also a social power that shapes cultural understandings, influences public policy decisions, and drives economic development.
The institutionally structured and hierarchically organized profession of science is itself a cultural power analogous to government,
military, and financial institutions and organizations.
The Apostle Paul’s language for the multifaceted “powers” that
rule our world may be interpreted as naming the spiritual ethos of
political, economic, and cultural systems and institutions.64 These
powers are good because they were originally created by God; as
part of the created order, however, they participate in the Fall
of creation precipitated by sin and rebellion. Yet, insofar as they
are created by God they are redeemable as part of the restoration
of creation through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Hence, the three-fold judgment on the powers: the powers are
good, the powers are fallen, the powers are being redeemed. The
“domination system” through which fallen power functions in this
world structures power in such a way as to favor the strong over
the weak, the rich over the poor, the educated over the uneducated, the ruler over the ruled, those with defense systems over
those vulnerable to attack.65 Control, especially by way of coercion
and violence, both psychological and physical, is the way of the
domination system. The domination system, bent on control, is
a rebellion against God’s Kingdom, which is a domination-free
order (as manifest in the Magnificat and the Beatitudes).
64. I follow the line of interpretation by Hendrik Berkhof, Christ and the Powers
(Scottdale, Pa.: Herald Press, 1977), John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing, 1992), and Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992). The term “powers,” which refers here to the collection of Greek words used by Paul (exousiae, dunamis, stoichieia) is variously translated as “authorities,” “dominions,” “principalities” and “powers.”
65. “Domination system” is Wink’s interpretation of the biblical term kosmos, usually
translated as “world.”
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Now, science is a cultural expression of what Aristotle called
“the natural desire to know,” and the human knowing and technique as well as human organization involved in scientific practice are capacities created by God as much as they are in relation
to other human activities. Thus, science as power—intellectual,
technical, social, and institutional—participates in both the goodness of creation and the fallenness of creation, alongside the other
fallen powers of our world. Because it is rooted in capacities originally created by God, science as multifaceted power is both good
and redeemable, even though as fallen it holds potential for evil in
our world. From a theological perspective, therefore, the myth of
ethical neutrality is all the more a nonstarter because science participates in the Fall of creation. Science, though not value-neutral,
is not evil but ambiguous: Science is good, fallen, and redeemable,
all at once.
Science as Fallen Power
Science, as both a social institution and a research endeavor, is
caught up in multiple facets of the domination system. As a culturally based social institution, science has been allied historically
with the domination system linking race, gender, class, and geography that favors—politically and economically—white over
nonwhite, male over female, elite over common, and north over
south. This alliance between scientific power of control and social power of control has produced scientific theories (particularly
concerning race and gender) that distort the reality of nature and
betray the prejudices of the privileged.66 As a research endeavor,
66. See Dava Sobel, Longitude (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), James D. Watson,
The Double Helix (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1980), Stephen J. Gould, The
Mismeasure of Man (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1996), Daniel J. Kevles, In the
Name of Eugenics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), and Evelyn
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by reason of its need for public-sector funding or private-sector
patronage, a considerable constituency of science is caught up in
the military-industrial complex, which links scientific research
and arms manufacturers (typically subsidized by taxpayers through
appropriations via the Departments of Defense and Energy) with
U.S. foreign policy that often favors corrupt governments in developing countries, enriching arms manufacturers and propping
up repressive rulers at the expense of both the basic welfare of the
domestic poor and the human rights and democratic aspirations
of the dispossessed and disenfranchised of the developing world.
This theological critique of science can be extended beyond the
intersection of science with society. Understanding science as a
form of power of control, and not simply as an abstract set of
knowledge claims, and recognizing that the powers in our world
are fallen open science to theological critique precisely at the hinge
of the myth of ethical neutrality and the division of moral labor—
the utilitarian conception of science as a value-neutral means to
independently validated ends. The Fall of creation implies that
power, in whatever form or however used, is not value-neutral
from the start but rather already participates in fallen structures
via the domination system prior to our instrumental uses of power
for human ends. Power of control, therefore, far from being an
unequivocal good, is not even an innocent instrument corrupted
only extrinsically by evil uses such that it is only the ends of action that call for evaluation. Because power of control is fallen and
thus already “bent” toward domination from the first moment we
utilize it, it can never be considered in its mere instrumentality
but is always in need of theological critique. Utilitarianism is thus
Fox Keller and Helen Longino, eds., Feminism and Science (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
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a nonstarter: There can be no separate evaluation of means and
ends, or justification of value-neutral scientific means by value-
laden social ends, because the scientific means are already fallen
and, hence, always potentially corruptive and destructive of the
social ends.
Because science is a power of control and thus participates in
the Fall of creation, and because the fallenness of power lies beyond the competence of human technique to overcome it, science
cannot “save” itself from the Fall by its own power. Even if science
were conceived in utilitarian terms as a neutral means to human
ends, therefore, it is always in need of justification on grounds
that transcend the ostensible human ends it serves. Thus, the instrumental use of scientific means for social ends requires ethical
justification on theological grounds over and above the epistemological criteria of scientific practice. Science that is successful in
its own terms and by its own criteria, even science that ostensibly
serves social ends, cannot be considered morally innocent; there
are some things that science must not do, because there are some
uses of power that are wrong, no matter how useful they might
seem to human judgment. NOMA is thus a nonstarter: The separation of science into a self-regulating domain free from theological critique effectively assumes that successful science is morally
innocent, which is precisely what cannot be assumed on account
of the Fall.
If we now combine the ontological ambiguity of human existence with the fallenness of worldly power, we may argue: Because
(a) human beings belong to the created order, (b) power within
the created order is fallen, and (c) science as power is both enabled
by the capacities of the created order and enables control over the
created order, it follows that science is always already, though not
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irredeemably, implicated in the moral ambiguity of a fallen world.
All human projects, science included, are undertaken in a fallen
world—a world in which power is already structured by political,
economic, and cultural forms in such a way that power of control
functions with an “inertial” tendency favoring “haves” over “have-
nots,” a tendency of power to accumulate power for its own sake
that must be consciously recognized and actively resisted. Because
in a fallen world all power of control is thus “warped” in favor of
the strong over the weak, rich over poor, and so on, science, too,
functions along a “gradient” toward the domination of humanity.
Despite scientists’ best intentions of serving human ends by scientific means, therefore, they cannot escape responsibility for the
uses of scientific knowledge. Science, like all human activity in a
fallen world, is in need of redemption even if it proves itself successful in enhancing or enabling our control over nature. Indeed,
because fallen power is structured in favor of domination, the very
ideal of control, whether in science or politics, requires theological
critique.
Responsible Science: A Christian-Critical Perspective
Christians and Christian institutions should not abandon the
practice of science because of its fallen nature, as if we could escape
the Fall by avoiding science. At the same time, without sacrificing
the integrity of our faith, we cannot practice science as if it were
exempt from the Fall. On account of the theological critique of
science as fallen power, responsible science from a Christian perspective must be accountable not only to values that transcend the
scientific pursuit (the common good) but also to values grounded
in transcendent reality (God’s Kingdom). We might thus say that
responsible science requires the “transvaluation” of science, the
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evaluation and ordering of science according to transcendent values. To implement the transvaluation of science, Christians who
practice science and Christian institutions that support scientific
research ought to do so only within the boundary values of God’s
Kingdom (human dignity and nonviolence) and should seek to
orient science toward the inverted priorities of God’s Kingdom
(good news for the poor). In Christian practice, responsible science
thus entails: the renunciation of certain areas of scientific research;
the ransoming of science from evil uses; and the reorientation of
research priorities.
Science and the Kingdom
Whereas the myth of ethical neutrality locates science in the timeless realm of Platonic ideas, the theological critique of science as
fallen power properly locates it between the historical horizons of
creation and redemption. The evaluation of scientific practice and
the corresponding judgment of responsibility in science, therefore,
ought not to be abstracted from eschatology, from the coming
fulfillment of God’s Kingdom. From a Christian perspective, it is
ultimately Kingdom values by which science, as means and end,
must be judged. Within the eschatological horizons of beginning
and end, there are two landmarks that indicate the divine purpose in the created order—God’s creation of the world and God’s
redemption of the world—and thus two “boundary values” that
demarcate the ethical limits of human power: the dignity of the
human person created in the image of God 67 and the nonviolent
67. By “dignity” I mean that the individual human person possesses a transcendent
worth, a worth that is not founded upon either material value or human interest and
that cannot under any circumstance be subordinated to human freedom of choice for
the sake of expedience.
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way of the cross by which God is redeeming “all things” through
Christ’s victory over the fallen powers. As soon as we adopt
Kingdom eschatology and look to Jesus as the Incarnation of the
Kingdom, the one in whom Kingdom ends and worldly means
are perfectly fitted, it becomes clear why powers of control are
to be held in suspicion: No worldly power of control, no matter
how benevolently exercised, not even when wielded by Jesus, can
fulfill the Kingdom. Hence, just as Jesus resisted the temptation
to temporal control by material power to establish the Kingdom,
so also the human exercise of power must resist the temptation to
domination through science.
This eschatological judgment begins with recognizing that the
scientific pursuit is not an absolute value and, hence, that freedom of research is not an unconditional imperative. Responsible freedom, including the freedom of research, must serve ends
transcending both freedom and science—the common good and,
above all, God’s Kingdom. Moreover, one might define “God”
operationally as “the source of one’s values and the center of one’s
loyalties.” Thus, to insulate science from theological-ethical critique as a self-justifying project by declaring knowledge to be an
end in itself and, hence, the source of an unimpeachable imperative is, for the Christian, tantamount to idolatry, the setting up
of a competing kingdom. As Niebuhr put it, “It does not seem
entirely a figure of speech to say that sometimes for some of the
devotees of science, if not for scientists themselves, the scientific
method has become a god.” 68 Instead, the Christian who practices
and uses science responsibly must also be able to critique it from
an eschatological perspective that encompasses and judges both
68. Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism, 85. Niebuhr characterizes such a view as a form of
henotheism.
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the methods and aims of science according to Kingdom values.
So, while responsible Christians need not abandon science, neither must they serve science as an absolute value and autonomous
project.
Renunciation in Science
The first step in transvaluing science according to God’s Kingdom is to acknowledge that some scientific pursuits transgress the
boundary values of human dignity and nonviolence and are thus
“out of bounds.” Just as during his temptations and trials, Jesus
renounced controlling, dominating, and violent forms of power
because of their inherent incompatibility with God’s Kingdom,
fidelity to God’s Kingdom requires renunciation where the scientific means and ends are inherently incompatible with Kingdom values and goals. Not all powers are created (e.g., God’s own
creative power) or were put under human responsibility for the
sake of preparing the way of the Kingdom (e.g., the power of life
and death). Therefore, the very exercise of, or even claim to, such
power by human beings already indicates an evil—an unjust usurpation of God’s prerogative—such that there is no possible virtuous exercise of such power.
So, it is no moral credit to us when on occasion we refrain from
exercising a power that was not within our rightful claim in the
first place; the only morally responsible action worthy of praise
is the renunciation of claim to that power, not the prudent or restrained use thereof. For example, when SS Commandant Amon
Goeth follows the advice of war profiteer Oskar Schindler to show
restraint and (temporarily) “pardons” one of the Jewish prisoners in his slave labor camp rather than summarily executing him,
his action does not express virtue, because the power to kill was
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not within his moral right to exercise to begin with; unless he renounces claim to that power, his action expresses only further self-
indulgence.69 The morally responsible exercise of power, scientific
or otherwise, begins with the reverent humility that ancient Hebrew poets called “the fear of the Lord”—acknowledging that we
are not God and thus have limited claims to legitimate power. The
upshot for our purposes is this: Science in the service of a power
that human beings have no moral right to exercise in the first place
(namely, research complicit in undermining human dignity or enabling violence) is already an evil and ought to be renounced from
the beginning, not merely restrained after its evil use. There thus
are limitations to invoking Paul’s instruction to the Christians at
Corinth as a guide for responsible scientific research—“ ‘Everything is permissible,’ but not everything is beneficial. ‘Everything
is permissible,’ but not everything is constructive.” (1 Cor 10:23)—
precisely because (as Paul himself would acknowledge) not everything is permissible in the first place.
Taking into consideration the boundary value of the dignity
of the human being created in the divine image leads us, first,
to renounce science in the name of controlling domination over
human life. Human cloning, for example, grasps at God’s sovereign creative power over life: It seeks to recreate the human being
in human, rather than divine, image. It would effectively convert
the human being created for serving God’s Kingdom into an instrument of human interests by shaping human biology in accord
with human social, economic, and political values. Cloning would
thus undermine human dignity by eroding the transcendent value
69. Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List: A Novel (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993),
212ff.
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of the human person. Even cloning a child for the ostensibly humanitarian purpose of having a donor match to cure a rare disease
would undermine human dignity: The clone would be conceived
as a means to her sibling’s welfare. It would not express virtue for
scientists to clone one human being and then show restraint either
by refraining from doing so again or by refusing to divulge knowledge of the technique or by seeking to have it banned by law.
There is no way to undermine human dignity in moderation—the
only morally responsible course of action is renunciation.
Another renunciation along similar lines should be made in
the case of cryogenics. Cryogenics is an attempt to achieve victory
over death—the indefinite prolongation of human life—by scientific means. From the perspective of Christian eschatology, hope
for conquering death is anchored in the promise of a glorified and
incorruptible body made possible through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, not the technological manipulation of the
natural and corruptible body. Thus, scientific innovation aimed at
overcoming death via biotechnology cuts directly across Christian
faith by anchoring hope in science—in nature-enhanced human
power of control—rather than in God’s sovereignty over life and
death as witnessed by resurrection. What Gilbert Meilaender
writes concerning human experimentation in general applies as
well to cryogenics research:
Placing our hope in the forward march of medical research, we deceive ourselves into imagining that it could
be redemptive, that it might overcome the sting of death.
. . . But the march of progress within human history is not
itself redemptive, and God ultimately deals with suffering in his own mysterious way. . . . Christians, therefore,
have no good reason to [completely] renounce the cause of
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medical research, but our commitment to it ought to be a
chastened one, liberated from the fear that makes an idol of
our hopes.70
The scientific pursuit of cryogenic technology, in effect, denies the
limits of our creaturely finitude and thus makes an idol of natural
duration, substitutes natural duration for glorified life as our eternal destiny.
Taking the boundary value of nonviolence into consideration,
second, leads us to renounce science in the service of destruction.
Nuclear weapons research (all weapons research, I would say) is
inherently incompatible with the fulfillment of the Kingdom, in
which swords are beaten into ploughshares, not vice versa. One
might argue that nuclear weapons research could be subjected to
an international political order that would restrain their production and use within rational and just limits. Such a view, however,
projects the wrong eschatology: Christian hope is anchored in
Christ’s victory and his coming Kingdom, not in human rationality or institutions (not even the United Nations). Regarding the
atomic bomb, in particular, the only morally responsible action
would have been to renounce the right to make such a weapon, not
merely to make it and then, as advocated by a small group of scientists in the Manhattan Project, transfer the right to use it to an
international political body.71 The implication here is that finishing
the atomic bomb, testing it, and then leaving responsibility for its
use to an unwitting society was an act of extreme self-indulgence
by (the majority of) the Los Alamos scientists, especially their
leader, J. Robert Oppenheimer.
70. Gilbert Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer for Christians (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans Publishing, 1996), 108–9.
71. I refer here to the famous “Franck Report,” reprinted in Jungk, 348–60.
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Renunciations along similar lines may also be called for concerning some new classes of technologies because of their inherent
destructive potential. Bill Joy, cofounder of Sun Microsystems,
expresses deep concern over the emerging technologies of the
twenty-first century—genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and
robotics—each of which carries the possibility of self-replication,
a potential for destruction even beyond that of nuclear weapons,
raising the prospect of human extinction species via uncontrolled
self-replicating technologies. After considering and rejecting ways
of developing shields against such prospects as cures almost worse
than the disease, Joy questions a scientific pursuit unbound by limits and proposes that such research be restricted or even renounced
altogether:

Joy’s concern echoes that of Niebuhr and Meilaender cited above:
The latent danger in the scientific pursuit of self-replicating technology is not only degradation and destruction of humanity, but
idolatry—the fabrication for ourselves of a power to replace God.

Joy thus calls for a humbler science, a pursuit restrained by conscience and guided by wisdom, which in his view tell us to limit
research: “It would seem worthwhile to question whether we
need to take such a high risk of total destruction to gain yet more
knowledge and yet more things; common sense says that there is
a limit to our material needs—and that certain knowledge is too
dangerous and is best forgone.” 73
Extending the theological-ethical critique of power to scientific means also points to the renunciation of certain experimental methods. The end of knowledge by itself cannot ever justify
the scientific means used to acquire it. No matter how useful the
knowledge that we seek is by human measures, the methods of science still need to be critiqued according to Kingdom values beyond
utilitarian and pragmatic criteria. Considering again the boundary
values of human dignity and nonviolence, research methods that
cause suffering or loss of life, restrict human freedom or degrade
human life, or cause environmental destruction must be closely
scrutinized and perhaps rejected.
Consider some examples. Experimental methods directly causing, or likely to cause, loss of human life must, of course, be renounced outright. Because freedom is an essential facet of human
dignity, experimenting on human subjects who have not given
informed consent or who cannot understand the risks of the experiment (e.g., children and the mentally handicapped), give consent, or refuse it (e.g., prisoners or comatose patients) must also be
strictly renounced. Without the right of informed consent, human
subjects become nothing more than another laboratory instrument
or material, a denial of their God-given dignity. Furthermore,
any experimental situation subjecting human beings to degrading

72. Bill Joy, “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us,” Wired 8.04 (April 2000).

73. Ibid.

The only realistic alternative I see is relinquishment: to limit
development of the technologies that are too dangerous,
by limiting our pursuit of certain kinds of knowledge . . .
if open access to and unlimited development of knowledge
henceforth puts us all in clear danger of extinction, then
common sense demands that we reexamine even these basic,
long-held beliefs. . . . It is this further danger that we now
fully face—the consequences of our truth-seeking. The truth
that science seeks can certainly be considered a dangerous
substitute for God if it is likely to lead to our extinction.72
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conditions (e.g., humiliation, intentional infliction of pain for no
other purpose or infliction of pain disproportionate to the purpose,
or deprivation of basic needs such as food, water, shelter, or sleep)
must be rejected even if informed consent has been obtained. For
the Kingdom calls us to lift up the lowly, bind up wounds, and
supply basic needs.
Ransom of Science
Beyond recognizing that scientific pursuit is not an absolute value
but is accountable to transcendent values, such that some scientific
means and ends must be renounced for the sake of the Kingdom,
the transvaluation of science can point us toward the redemption
of fallen science. From a Christian perspective, we should refrain
from judging as intrinsically evil anything that God has created
and intended for human responsibility. Not even nuclear physics,
which has given us terrible weapons of mass destruction, is beyond
redemption. In a fallen world, nonetheless, we might assess scientific knowledge—in particular, science containing an inherently
practical potential for mass destruction or undermining dignity—
an initial moral debt that any uses must repay to the benefit of
humanity. To use a theological metaphor, such scientific knowledge in a fallen world is in a state of “original sin” and cannot be
redeemed by believing that, as Edward Teller put it, “knowledge
in the end will be turned into blessing” by the goodness of human
intentions.74 Teller’s faith is theologically adequate only if we assume that God will bless whatever well-intentioned human beings do in the name of knowledge. That such an assumption is
false is precisely what the Fall is about in the first place. Instead,
74. Teller, “Atomic Scientists Have Two Responsibilities,” 356.
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such science must be “ransomed” by “sacrifice,” freed from captivity to evil by service for the good of humanity in the name of the
Kingdom.
Because of the moral ambiguity in which science participates,
the ransom of science that has destructive or degrading potential
from original sin requires the continual evaluation of both means
and ends for conformity to Kingdom values. Consider nuclear
physics and human genetics. Both of these sciences, which have
inherent potential for mass destruction and undermining dignity,
not only inherit original sin but also have incurred an actual moral
debt, due to the actual use of that potential in nuclear and eugenic holocaust. Thus, the very knowledge of nuclear fission/fusion or of the human genome would already be in need of being
ransomed, a debt only compounded by the atrocities of Hiroshima
and Auschwitz.75
Regarding the ransom of nuclear physics, we must ask whether
nonviolent applications that serve Kingdom values of peace and
well-being—for example, civilian energy production and nuclear
medicine—are paying the initial debt over and above the enormous
liability incurred at Hiroshima and via the arms race, or whether
these applications are only compounding the debt through problems such as nuclear waste. Regarding the ransom of human genetics, we must ask whether good applications that serve Kingdom
values of justice and healing—for example, exonerating via DNA
testing those wrongly convicted and sentenced to death and applying cellular therapy for genetically linked diseases—are paying
75. I use “Auschwitz” here to indicate the Nazi program of race “purification,” which
was the apogee of eugenics in the twentieth century. Concerning the eugenic policies
of Nazi Germany and their precedents in the United States, as well as the eugenic
goals of the scientific study of human heredity, see Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics.
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the initial debt over and above the enormous liability incurred at
Auschwitz, or whether such applications as genetic enhancement,
genetic discrimination in insurance and employment, and embryonic stem-cell research are only compounding the debt.76
Could this redemptive process ever be finished by human effort? No. As long as the basic discovery and knowledge remain, so
does the potential harm in a fallen world. Neither nuclear physics nor human genetics will be fully redeemed by human effort
but will remain morally ambiguous, and thus in need of theological critique, short of the final consummation of the Kingdom by
Christ.
Reorientation of Science
Should we, recalling Hiroshima and Auschwitz, withdraw our
trust in science and simply cease doing research? No. At the very
76. It is assumed here, but not proved, that these latter applications negatively affect
human dignity. The undermining of human dignity involves treating the human person as having only instrumental value for human purposes rather than respecting the
human person as having transcendent value in God’s Kingdom. In the case of cloning
human embryos for stem cell research, for example, the threat to human dignity is
quite direct. Embryos are first “manufactured” and then treated as “repositories” of
“natural resources” to be “harvested” or “mined.” Once their usefulness is exhausted,
they are “discarded” as “waste.” In other cases (e.g., genetic enhancement and discrimination) the threat to human dignity is less direct and thus needs extended supporting
argument. Concerning the legal and ethical implications of genetic enhancement and
discrimination, see Roberta M. Berry, “From Involuntary Sterilization to Genetic Enhancement: The Unsettled Legacy of Buck v. Bell,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics
& Public Policy 12 (1998): 401–48, and “The Human Genome Project and the End
of Insurance,” University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 7 (1996): 205–56.
Regarding the manifold social, ethical, and legal implications of genetic information,
one will usefully consult Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood, eds., The Code of Codes:
Scientific and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1992).
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least, science and technology have enabled—one might even say,
have become indispensable to—the Christian mission of justice to
the poor, suffering, and oppressed; and this is a responsibility we
should not abdicate, even (and especially) in a fallen world. The
scientist Richard Bube, a Christian, echoes this point:
Although there are certainly areas of human development
where a simple cessation of activity is the informed response
of Christians in science, it is clear that the general responsibility of Christians and the Christian community to meet
the needs of the people in the world cannot be met by advocating a simple end to all science. If, in fact, science did
not exist, Christians would have to invent it in order to be
faithful to their call to be stewards of the earth for God and
their fellow human beings.77
If it is within our power to use science and technology to do justice
for the poor, suffering, and oppressed, then we ought to do so, insofar as our choice of science-enabled means upholds the dignity
of the human person created in the image of God and conforms to
the nonviolent way of Jesus.
The choice between a value-
neutral science and a value-
structured science is not available to us. Once we have recognized
that science is not, nor could be, a value-neutral project, the key
question for Christian responsibility thus becomes which values
should structure scientific research. While living in the “meantime” between the horizon of original creation and the horizon of
final redemption, and having set the moral limits of responsible
77. Bube, “A Crisis of Conscience for Christians in Science.”
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science according to the boundary values of human dignity and
nonviolence, we should further seek to reorient scientific research
toward the inverted priorities of God’s Kingdom.
God’s Kingdom is an “upside-down” kingdom. The kingdoms
of this world, structured by fallen power, favor strong over weak,
rich over poor, “first” over “last.” In the Kingdom of God, however, the power ratios are inverted: The weak are lifted up from the
dust, and the strong are pulled down from the thrones from which
they have oppressed the weak; the poor are filled with good, and
the rich who have filled themselves are sent away empty; those
who have been put behind others are made first, and those who
have put themselves before others are made last.78 This inverted
ordering of Kingdom priorities has been dubbed the “preferential
option for the poor” in Christian social ethics.
As we observed above, science as fallen power has often both
reflected and reinforced the power priorities of worldly kingdoms.
As Kingdom power overturns the perverted ordering of worldly
priorities, so the transvaluation of science according to a preferential option would seek to reorient science toward the benefit of
those who have been “put down,” “put out,” and “left behind” by
fallen power. This would mean the redirection of research toward
objectives such as: enhancing our capacity for food production for
the world’s hungry; finding cures for “neglected diseases” that afflict the poor peoples of developing nations;79 designing appropriate technologies for developing nations; and so on.
78. Donald B. Kraybill, The Upside-Down Kingdom, rev. ed. (Scottdale, Pa.: Herald
Press, 1990).
79. Carlos M. Morel, “Neglected Diseases: Underfunded Research and Inadequate
Health Interventions,” EMBO Report 4 Supp. (2003): S35–S38.
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Consider here what might seem a scientific discipline far removed from such concerns: cartography. The science of map-
making seems value-
neutral enough—it is simply about the
objective representation of physical features of the terrestrial surface, right? Not quite. For elementary geometrical reasons, the
projection of a spherical surface onto a flat surface introduces
distortions, such that every flat world map will have inaccuracies. But not every world map is inaccurate in the same way—the
distortions depend on the mapmaker’s choices and thus, implicitly, on the mapmaker’s values. Picture in your mind the world
map that most of us first encountered in middle school social
studies class. This map, known as the Mercator Projection, has
several limitations in accuracy, most obviously the extreme exaggeration of land sizes near the poles (Canada, Greenland, Antarctica, etc.). What is less obvious is the implicit bias of this map’s
appearance: The distortion of land size increases as you move
from the equator toward the poles, such that Europe and North
America appear proportionally larger than equatorial Africa and
South America. Now focus your mind’s eye to the center of the
map. What’s there? Western Europe. Why is that? Because this
sixteenth-century map was made for the purpose of guiding the
navigation of European traders to tropical ports in service of the
new mercantile strategy, by which European nations sought to
augment domestic wealth and international power by military
control of material resources in foreign locales, a strategy that
provoked wars and promoted colonialism.
Although a significant advance in nautical cartography, the
Mercator Projection not only reflects the geographical bias of
its Flemish maker but also reinforces the assumed superiority of
those whose interests it was designed to serve. And that, Denis
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Wood argues, reveals how any map works: Maps serve interests
that the map itself masks.80 Suppose, then, that we were to reorient cartography according to a preferential option—and thus
choose a mathematical projection that, say, implicitly recognized
the equal value of people living in the equatorial regions by representing their land sizes in equal proportion to the land sizes of
those living in Europe and North America. One map we might
end up with is called the Gall-Peters Projection, which represents
equal areas on the earth’s surface with equal areas on the world
map, such that Africa is seen as much larger than Europe, which
it actually is. The point here is not about choosing a perfect map;
no map is perfect—the Gall-Peters Projection still seriously distorts the polar regions. The point, rather, is that once we acknowledge that there is no value-neutral map, the question is which
values maps should serve. Having become conscious of the values
implicit in all maps, Christian cartographers should seek to “unmask the power” of maps and design maps that not only represent
terrestrial facts but also serve Kingdom goals.
Even if we restructure science according to a preferential option, we must remain mindful of the ethical ambiguity of scientific research: every scientific achievement in a fallen world, even
science that is well-intentioned for human benefit, will have its
shadow side. The reorientation of science will thus require a reassessment of progress. Wendell Berry has aptly written:
Nobody seems to be able to subtract the negative results
of scientific “advances” from the positive. . . . If science
has sponsored both an immensity of knowledge and an

immensity of violence, what is the gain? . . . We need to
require from our teachers, researchers, and leaders—and
attempt for ourselves—a responsible accounting of technological progress.81
In effect, Berry is calling for a new type of history of science that
observes a responsible accounting of progress, accounting for life
lost and communities destroyed as well as knowledge gained and
technique mastered. In economic metaphor, in good conscience
we can no longer continue to “externalize” the actual human costs
of scientific-technological progress. An example of responsible accounting of scientific-technological progress is the recent report
by the World Commission on Dams, which acknowledges that
“dams have made an important and significant contribution to
human development, but in too many cases, the social and environmental costs have been unacceptable and often unnecessary.” 82
Take, for another example, genetically modified crops, over which
there is considerable controversy. There is no question that genetically modified plants have significantly enhanced the ability
of subsistence farmers in developing nations to grow crops to feed
their families. A responsible accounting of this scientific progress,
however, would ask whether improvement in food production capability to match increases in world population does justice for
the poor and hungry peoples in the developing world and liberates them from cycles of famine and poverty exacerbated by civil
war and political corruption, or whether such scientific progress

80. Denis Wood, The Power of Maps (New York: The Guilford Press, 1992).

81. Wendell Berry, Life Is a Miracle: An Essay against Modern Superstition (Washington,
D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000), 70, 91,136.
82. “Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making,” Final Report, World Commission on Dams, November 2000, available at www.dams.org.
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serves to entrap them in a new form of global economic slavery to
biotech companies in the developed world that enrich themselves
at the expense of wild crop varieties, local agricultural techniques,
and sustainable rural communities.83
To implement this reorientation of science, I propose that
Christian universities that support scientific research adopt institutional practices that promote responsible science, such as the
following. First, institutional review boards should require faculty
research proposals and funding requests to address not only the
apparent ethical questions concerning research methods, which
has become standard practice, but also the potential social impacts
of scientific research—and to do so prior to the commencement
of research. Second, science departments should require faculty
to compile regular reports not only of courses taught, papers published, and dissertations directed, but also how their research results have been utilized by others and the actual social impact of
that use. Third, faculty senates and academic deans should exercise
a preferential option in their institutional practices of recognition
(awards and honors) and advancement (promotion and tenure),
giving preferential recognition and advancement to scientists
whose research aligns with Kingdom priorities.
As we look beyond renunciation in science toward the ransom and reorientation of science for the sake of the Kingdom, we
keep in view a constant theme: humanity and the world are not to
be saved by any form or amount of worldly power of knowledge
and control—political, financial, scientific, or otherwise. Thus,
in seeking to transvalue science in accord with God’s Kingdom,
83. See the alternative views of Jeff Stoltzfus and Marion Meyer, both with Mennonite Central Committee, in “Biotechnology: A Technology of Life or Death?” A Common Place 6 (November 2000): 8–11.
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Kingdom eschatology limits us to a modest goal: not to save the
world by the strength of our science, but to witness faithfully in
the world to the Lord of the Kingdom through the right exercise
of power via the responsible practice of science.
Responsible Science and Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue
The transvaluation of science in accord with the Kingdom values
of human dignity and nonviolence requires that we bring science
back into connection with those areas of human thinking and
doing by which we receive and appropriate those values. Because
it is only from the perspective of transcendence that all human
persons acquire real dignity as creatures of God and that principled nonviolence finds its true motivation as an imitation of Jesus,
responsible science must be accountable to the transcendent—the
eternal and spiritual—as well as the temporal-spatial and material.
This points us toward a constructive engagement of science with
ethics, philosophy, and theology, disciplines that address themselves to the universalities of human value and cosmic existence.
To be responsible, moreover, science must not only be accountable to the values “over its head,” as it were, but also acknowledge
the values “beneath its feet.” This is the moral claim of propriety, as Wendell Berry calls it, which raises several questions that
“address themselves to all the disciplines, but . . . do not call for
specialized answers.” 84 To be responsible in any human endeavor,
including science, we cannot act as if we do not inhabit a finite
earth at a particular time and place. So, we must ask: What may
we do with our abilities to serve our interest at this time that is
respectful of our local place and appropriate to our actual condi84. Berry, Life Is a Miracle, 15.
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tion? To become aware of the question of propriety, science must
be reawakened to the “life-world”—the lived reality of everyday
experience in familiar surroundings—as the homeland of its thinking and doing, as the soil from which its activity, both theoretical and experimental, takes its start and in relation to which the
very meaning of science as discovery of the real has its origin.85
Thus, science must not only engage with ethics, philosophy, and
theology but also converse with history, literature, and the arts,
those human expressions that disclose the life-world in its manifold particularities, revealing a world shot through with values that
motivate our most basic existential commitments before scientific
thinking even appears within human consciousness.
If science is to address both transcendence and the life-world,
if science is to be both accountable to suprascientific universalities and cognizant of prescientific particularities, dialogue across
disciplines within the academy is essential. Berry reaches a similar
conclusion: the inadequacy of science’s own professional standards
to the task of assessing its progress responsibly, he writes, “is a
sign of the incompleteness of science in itself—which is a sign of
the need for a strenuous conversation among all the branches of
learning.” 86 This crossdisciplinary dialogue would, ideally, lead to
a transformation of science education. It is no longer sufficient to
leave students with the impression that scientific research is morally innocent insofar as and to the extent that it satisfies narrowly
defined professional standards of competence and criteria of suc85. See Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970) and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London:
Routledge, 1962).
86. Berry, Life Is a Miracle, 145.
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cess. Teaching scientific knowledge and technique confers power
of control, but knowledge by itself is not wisdom, and technique is
not virtue. To confer such power of control to our students without appropriate moral guidance would be irresponsible in this age
of unmitigated exploitation by the market and the military of any
and every scientific-technological innovation with potential for
increasing profits or killing people. Christian universities should
thus adopt curriculum standards that require integrating the discussion of the social impact of science, the social responsibility
of the scientist, and the ethical conduct of research into all levels
of science education, from introductory undergraduate courses to
advanced graduate studies.87
Summation
Throughout this essay, we have reflected on the question of values and responsibility in science along ethical, philosophical, and
theological axes of analysis. We have seen from each angle that
science is not, nor could be, a value-neutral project. Whether analyzed as the practice of a profession, as the pursuit of knowledge,
or as a form of power, science is structured by values in both means
and ends, both methods and goals. The only question for consideration, therefore, is by which values science is to be structured.
The overarching theme of the argument presented here is that we
cannot in good faith assess the value and responsibility of science
by demarcating it from other domains of human value and responsibility through a division of moral labor that leaves science
responsible only for itself and answerable only to its own standards
87. This proposal could be extended also to secular institutions; see Erin A. Cech,
“Education: Embed Social Awareness in Science Curricula,” Nature 505 (2014): 477–
78 (January 23, 2014).
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of competence and criteria of success. Rather than allowing science to be practiced independently within a specialized sphere
of professional autonomy, science should be practiced within the
encompassing sphere of Christian responsibility. We can exercise
the power of science responsibly only when we do not cleave it
from transcendent values.
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